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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: APPELLEE MISCHARACTERIZES THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER 
Appellee argues that the doctrine of merger is inapplicable to the conviction 
offenses of Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping in the present case because 
the crime of Aggravated Burglary does not necessarily involve a detention. See Brief of 
Appellee at 26-27. This argument mischaracterizes the doctrine of merger. 
The doctrine of merger is & fact-related inquiry that is used "to preclude a 
multitude of convictions for essentially the same conduct." State v. Finlayson, No. 
980279, slip op. At 6 (Utah January 14, 2000) ("Finlavson II"). The application of the 
doctrine of merger does not depend on a theoretical comparison of statutory elements, as 
argued by Appellee. By contrast, application of the doctrine of lesser included offenses 
does require theoretical consistency of statutory elements according to Finlayson II: 
Under this section, an offense is an included offense when "[i]t is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (a) 
(emphasis added). As discussed above, rape and forcible sodomy do not require 
proof of detention, although detention is inherently an aspect of both crimes. See 
id. § 76-5-402(1) (rape); id. § 76-5-403 (2) (forcible sodomy). 
The Court of Appeals recognized that detention is an inherent aspect of 
both crimes, but nonetheless found section 76-1-402 applicable because of its 
emphasis on the facts of the case, not on the elements of the crime. This 
conclusion was in error. As we explained in Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, the inquiry of 
whether one crime is a lesser included offense of a greater crime under section 76-
1-402, turns on the statutorily defined elements of the two crimes. See 908 P.2d at 
861. That is, the court looks to the facts to determine what crime, or variation of 
the crime, was proved, but once this determination is made, the court looks to the 
statutory elements of the crime to determine whether it is an included offense. See 
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id. Accordingly, aggravated kidnaping is not a lesser included offense of rape or 
forcible sodomy within the meaning of section 76-1-402, because one of the 
statutory elements of aggravated kidnaping, i.e., confining, detaining, or 
transporting a victim, is not a statutory element of either of the sex offenses. 
Section 76-1-402, however, is not the only basis for finding that one set of 
facts may give rise to a merger of two or more separate crimes so as to preclude a 
multitude of convictions for essentially the same conduct. 
Id. at 5-6 (Conviction of Aggravated Kidnaping reversed based on doctrine of merger). 
Appellee acknowledges that Finlayson II adopted the following test for 
application of the doctrine of merger: 
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the 
other crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; 
and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in 
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or 
substantially lessens the risk of detection. 
Id. at 8 (citations omitted). Using this test, Appellant's detention of the victim was 
incidental to the commission of Aggravated Burglary. The evidence of Aggravated 
Burglary consisted of the following: (1) the defendants entered or remained unlawfully in 
the house (R:468[257]; (2) with the intent to steal marijuana (R:468[238]; and (3) while 
doing so Donald Dobson was shot by Hartley (R:340; 469[68]) and/or Neyna Davis, and 
others, was threatened with a gun (R:464[71]. See § 76-6-203, Utah Code Ann. (1999). 
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The evidence of Aggravated Kidnaping consisted of the following: (1) a single male took 
Neyna Davis from the livingroom to two rooms in the basement of the same house 
(R:464[66-79]; 468[262]); (2) this detention lasted several minutes (R:464[78-79]; 
468[262; and (3) the purpose of this detention was to find the marijuana (R:464[72]; 
468[261]). See § 76-5-302, Utah Code Ann. (1999). Although it may be possible in 
theory to complete a burglary before kidnaping an occupant of the building (See Brief of 
Appellee at 27), the evidence at this trial demonstrates that the detention was brief and 
not independently significant because it was incidental to the commission of the burglary. 
On these facts, the doctrine of merger precludes conviction for Aggravated Kidnaping. 
POINT II: RELIANCE ON ERRONEOUS PARTS OF THE PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT IS PLAIN ERROR. 
Appellant has argued that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by 
relying on erroneous "Aggravating Circumstances" listed on Form 5 of the Presentence 
Investigation Report ("PSR"). See Brief of Appellant at 32-33. Appellee argues that this 
Court should refuse to consider this claim because trial counsel failed to make the same 
objection to the trial court. See Brief of Appellee at 31. This Court should consider 
Appellant's claim according to the doctrine of plain error, despite the failure of trial 
counsel to object. 
This Court may take notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
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they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Rule 103(d), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1999). Utah courts have adopted a two-part test to determine whether plain 
error exists. First, the error must be obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient 
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 
1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). Error is considered to be of sufficient magnitude that it affects 
the substantial rights of a party where there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the accused in the absence of the error. State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 903 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
The following allegations, inter alia, were used as Aggravating Circumstances on 
Form 5 of the PSR: "(3) Victim was particularly vulnerable"; "(4) Injury to person or 
property loss was unusually extensive"; and "(5) Offense was characteri2:ed by extreme 
cruelty or depravity." R: 453 [PSR at Form 5]. Form 5 directs that the writer "Only use 
aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in the conviction offense or the 
calculation of criminal history score." It is implicit to the conviction offenses that the 
victim of an aggravated burglary was vulnerable, that the victim of a homicide died, and 
that an aggravated burglary is morally bad. These facts do not amount to aggravated 
circumstances that would justify upward departure from the guideline sentence for the 
conviction offenses. In the present case there is no evidence that the conviction offenses 
were committed in a manner qualitatively and quantitatively different and more culpable 
than necessary to accomplish the crimes. See, e.g.. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1218-
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19 (Utah 1989) (Homicide not especially heinous, atrocious, cruel or exceptionally 
depraved where victim was stabbed seven times and may have been conscious several 
minutes after first infliction of deep wound because record contains no evidence that 
Tuttle intended to do or in fact did anything but kill his victim by stabbing her); see also 
State v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993) ( six-year old neighbor girl who was 
victim of murder, child kidnaping and aggravated sexual abuse is "unusually 
vulnerable"). For this reason it is erroneous to rely on these allegations as aggravating 
circumstances in the present case. The error is obvious according to the directions of 
Form 5. 
Second, this error is of sufficient magnitude according to the doctrine of plain 
error because Form 5 of the PSR directs that aggravating circumstances "may justify and 
departure from the guidelines." The harm is apparent in the present case because the 
sentencing court did depart upward from the Agency Recommendation for sentencing set 
forth in the PSR. R: 453. 
For these reasons it was plain error for the sentencing court to consider these 
allegations as aggravating circumstances. Therefore this Court should take notice of 
Appellant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Application of the doctrine of merger to the conviction offenses of Aggravated 
Burglary and Aggravated Kidnaping is not precluded because, as a theoretical matter, 
Aggravated Burglary does not require a detention. The doctrine of merger is a fact-
related inquiry that prevents convictions for Aggravated Burglary and for Aggravated 
Kidnaping for essentially the same conduct in the present case. Furthermore, based on 
the doctrine of plain error, this Court should take notice of Appellant's claim that the trial 
court abused its discretion by relying on erroneous parts of the PSR despite the failure of 
trial counsel to object at sentencing. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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